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Abstract 
 
 
Pragmatism may be the aspect of William James’s thought for which he is best known; but, at the same 
time, James’s pragmatism may be among the most misunderstood doctrines of the past century. There are 
many meanings of word “pragmatism,” even within James’s own corpus. Not a single unified doctrine, 
pragmatism may be better described as a collection of positions which together form a coherent 
philosophical system. This paper examines three interrelated uses of the term: (1) pragmatism as a 
temperament, (2) pragmatism as a philosophical method, and (3) pragmatism as a “humanistic” and 
“concrete” theory of knowledge and truth. Some critics infer that pragmatist truth is relative or subjective. 
This paper concludes with a consideration of James’s responses to such critics. Though James maintains 
truth is something both “made” and “satisfying,” he just as clearly affirms that as it develops, truth is ever 
constrained by the elements of extramental reality as well as previously vetted truths. This pragmatist truth 
is not a function of personal caprice, and the pragmatist is certainly not one who denies an objective order 
or bends the world to his wishes. 
 
 
I 
 
Pragmatism may be the aspect of William James’s thought for which he is best known, 
both within and outside the philosophic world. Ironically, however, James’s pragmatism 
may be among the most misunderstood doctrines of the past century, due at least in part 
to the fact that a number of other thinkers have appropriated the term for their own very 
distinct purposes.1 Moreover, the terms “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” are often used in 
common parlance, which perhaps leads people casually to assume that they know what 
Jamesian pragmatism is all about—it’s a simple doctrine that identifies truth with 
expediency, one that dismisses any notion of truth as universal or fixed, and that merely 
assigns the label “truth” to those ideas or beliefs that produce subjectively good results in 
the real world. “Whatever works” is what is “true.” Such generalizations about  Jamesian 
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pragmatism may be accurate, to a point, but they do not tell the whole story. Moreover, 
they lend themselves to serious distortions of James’s thought. 
 
Jamesian pragmatism deserves to be more carefully studied, and the generalizations about 
it made more precise, at the very least because its present distortions constitute a grave 
injustice to a man who spent many years trying to clarify his thought for the public. The 
subtitle of James’s well-known volume Pragmatism is “A New Name for Some Old 
Ways of Thinking,” and the present essay seeks to convey a sense of how James’s 
pragmatism is indeed just that. 
 
The set of lectures published together as Pragmatism is James’s most comprehensive 
presentation of his thought on the matter. Another volume, The Meaning of Truth, is 
subtitled “A Sequel to Pragmatism” and, like Pragmatism, is set of lectures and essays. 
Published one year before James’s death, it clarifies and reiterates key features of 
Jamesian pragmatism, and it also rebuts certain prominent critics. Here I consider these 
works together.  
 
There are many meanings of word “pragmatism,” even within James’s own corpus. Not a 
single unified doctrine, pragmatism may be better described as a collection of positions 
which together form a coherent philosophical system. In what follows I examine three 
interrelated uses of the term: (1) pragmatism as a temperament, (2) pragmatism as a 
philosophical method, and (3) pragmatism as a “humanistic” and “concrete” theory of 
knowledge and truth. As a temperament, pragmatism steers a middle course between the 
hard-nosed empiricism of professional science that insists on material, sensory evidence 
and the religious sensibility that is open to immaterial, spiritual realities but that often 
flies off into metaphysical schemes and abstractions not grounded in or justified by 
concrete experience. People with this temperament are practitioners of the method, which 
measures terms and propositions in terms of their concrete, experiential “cash value.” 
Moreover, this method gives rise to the humanistic and concrete theory of knowledge and 
truth, which maintains that truth is something made by us and that it is therefore both a 
function of our personal temperament and in some sense characterized as that which 
satisfies us.  
 
On the basis of these notions of truth as made and truth as that which satisfies, critics tend 
to infer that pragmatist truth is relative or subjective. I conclude with a consideration of 
James’s responses to such critics, in clarification and defense of his thought. Though he 
maintains truth is something both made and satisfying, he just as clearly affirms that as it 
develops, truth is ever constrained by the elements of extramental reality as well as 
previously vetted truths. Thus it is proper to understand that pragmatist truth is not a 
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function of personal caprice, and the pragmatist is certainly not one who denies an 
objective order or bends the world to his wishes. 
 
 
II 
 
Temperament. James begins Lecture I, “The Present Dilemma in Philosophy,” by noting 
the foundational significance of personal temperament in our intellectual lives. Our 
temperament directs our interpretation of the universe, “our individual way of just seeing 
and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.”2 It ultimately determines for each 
of us the legitimacy of any evidence or premise and, in turn, the success or failure of any 
philosophical argument. Typically, a philosopher will downplay or even deny the role of 
this personal and seemingly subjective factor; indeed, he will prefer “to sink the fact of 
his temperament…[H]e urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions.”3 Perhaps this 
is because it is difficult to establish the authority of any one temperament over another: 
Everyone has one, and for the most part everyone prefers his own, so to quest for 
authority in this realm is a fool’s errand. It is simpler to pretend that our own 
temperament isn’t there at all, or doesn’t play any determinative role, and to act as if our 
arguments were based on purely objective grounds. But, James asserts, in reality 
temperament is ever operative.  In the life of any thinker, “his temperament really gives 
him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence 
for him one way or the other.”4 Among those who dispute its influence, “[t]here arises…a 
certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions; the potentest of all our premises is 
never mentioned.”5 Temperament can never be eliminated; James laments not this fact, 
but rather the disingenuousness of those who deny it.  
 
This discussion of temperament is not some irrelevant or tangential psychologizing but 
rather a matter of serious epistemological import.6 Though they are eminently subjective 
and personal, temperaments are legitimately measured and compared. For James, one’s 
temperament serves to “put one in better or worse touch with the universe,”7 and so not 
all temperaments are equally valuable. According to James, along the temperamental 
spectrum, the basic divide is between what he calls “tender-mindedness” and “tough-
mindedness.” The tender-minded are sometimes said to be rationalistic, intellectualistic, 
idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, or dogmatical.8 In general, these are 
the devotees of abstract ideals and principles who are given to belief in an absolute force 
that creates and guides the universe. The tough-minded, by contrast, are referred to as 
empiricist, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, or 
skeptical.9 Consider the modern devotee of scientism who absolutizes the role of 
observable facts and data while holding all else to be suspect or irrelevant. It is evident 
that at either extreme on this spectrum of types there is likelihood, perhaps certainty, that 
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reality is misperceived, and so, one ought to guard against either extreme. Most people 
fall somewhere between the two poles and can be persuaded of the virtues and vices of 
both. Herein lies the essence of the moderate, pragmatist temperament. 
 
While most of us have temperaments falling somewhere between the extremes of tough-
mindedness and tender-mindedness, James notes that the present age teems with 
individuals who prefer the tough-minded, empiricist approach. Though the empirical-
scientific mode of thought may be dominant, there persists, as James observes, a need to 
philosophize, so to speak—a need, which is universal, to consider and take a position 
concerning the broader nature of the whole of reality, over and above its material, 
empirical details. In consequence, the tough-minded adopt a metaphysics that satisfies 
this need; they draw their metaphysical conclusions not on the basis of empirical-
scientific evidence, but in order to provide a suitable backdrop for the empirical-scientific 
enterprise. In tandem with the progress of science, a materialist worldview takes hold in 
the hearts of empirical scientific practitioners. 
 
For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the 
enlargement of the materialist universe and the diminution of man’s importance. The 
result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic and positivistic feeling. Man is no 
lawgiver to nature. She it is who stands firm; he it is who must accommodate himself. Let 
him record truth, inhuman tho it be, and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and 
courage are gone, the vision is materialistic and depressing…You get, in short, a 
materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find themselves congenially at 
home.10 
 
In James’s view, the materialist metaphysics of the tough-minded renders man passive 
and impotent, a mere observer and recorder of the active forces of nature. Materialist, 
tough-minded men are blind to the possible efficacy of man’s personal powers; therefore, 
a hasty and dismissive materialism may do serious injustice to reality, and indeed to the 
tough-minded themselves. 
 
By contrast, the religious philosophies of the tender-minded turn away from this 
materialism and adopt metaphysical schemes that leave room for the affirmation of 
personal spontaneity, responsibility, and moral values. All the versions of this religious 
philosophy have notable shortcomings, however, for according to James,  
 
[t]he more absolutistic philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction 
that they never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they 
offer us, the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught 
they show to the contrary, have made any one of a million other universes 
Essays Philos (2012) 13:1                                                                                                       Shaw | 35 
 
 
 
just as well as this. You can deduce no single actual particular from the 
notion of it.11 
 
These types of philosophies thus fail, though in a manner different from the failure of 
materialism. They do not satisfy the common religious needs of men, such as the desire 
for a personal God and a world in which one’s own freedom to act is real, meaningful, 
efficacious; nor do they to jibe with the generally tough-minded sensibility typical of the 
modern era. In their failure to make reference to the real world, they lose their credibility.   
 
In short, these religious philosophies provide mere rationalistic models that smooth over 
the messy details of experienced reality. According to James, any such system  
 
is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon 
it, a classic sanctuary in which the rationalistic fancy may take refuge 
from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts 
present. It is no explanation of our concrete universe, it is another thing 
altogether, a substitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape.12  
 
Hence philosophy’s bad name, at least in the view of the generally empiricist modern 
man, who considers the world of facts to be “a thing wide open,” to be observed and 
recorded, not artificially schematized. It is not proper to close off this open reality, which 
is precisely what philosophical systems do.13 Rationalist philosophy thus appears as mere 
artifice, and perhaps even as pretension. In any event, removed as it is from the world of 
experience, this sort of theorizing is something that cannot be countenanced by the 
empiricist modern man.  
 
The preceding analysis points to the “present dilemma in philosophy” of which the 
lecture’s title speaks: to date, all metaphysical schemes leave something to be desired. On 
the one hand, the materialist worldview that derives from tough-minded empiricism is 
fraught with “inhumanism and irreligion”; on the other, with the tender-minded, “you 
find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious but that keeps out of all 
definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows.”14 The “mixed” pragmatist 
temperament, which is in fact the temperament of most men, does not succumb to either 
horn of this dilemma. Indeed, the pragmatist temperament wishes somehow to split the 
difference. James summarizes, 
 
What you want is a philosophy that will not only exercise your powers of 
intellectual abstraction, but that will make some positive connexion with 
this actual world of finite human lives.15 
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The pragmatist temperament incorporates the concerns of both the tough-minded and the 
tender-minded. It will never deny the value of empirical science and the importance of 
observable facts; moreover, it decries the sort of “vicious intellectualism” that abstracts 
from concrete experience.16 At the same time, however, it wishes to affirm the larger 
vision of the universe as something more than a mindless mechanism, as a setting in 
which our decisions and actions are real and significant factors. The pragmatist 
temperament will insist that the universe is a place where things like values, ideals, and 
God make sense.17 And they do so, it is important to point out, not as mere abstractions 
but only within the context of the world as we experience it; moreover, honest empiricists 
will be attuned to the experiential nature of such things—that is, they will recognize that 
metaphysical entities have meanings that are borne out in and justified through our 
experience. Believing in these things makes a concrete, observable difference in people’s 
lives and in the world. So the pragmatist temperament coherently integrates tough-
mindedness and tender-heartedness: it is religious precisely because it is honestly 
empirical. James writes: 
 
I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy 
both kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at 
the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy 
with facts.18 
 
Pragmatism has a special mandate: it “preserves…a cordial relation with facts, 
and…neither begins nor ends by turning positive religious constructions out of doors—it 
treats them cordially as well.”19 Pragmatism mediates between the scientific and religious 
points of view,20 satisfying the intellectual needs of those who are inclined to respect 
both science and religion. This view of the pragmatist temperament serves as background 
for understanding the development of pragmatist philosophy in general.  
 
 
III 
 
A Method of Settling Disputes. James begins Lecture II of Pragmatism, “What 
Pragmatism Means,” by setting the scene for a metaphysical debate, the resolution of 
which is an apt example of his pragmatist method at work. There are two players: a 
squirrel clinging to one side of a tree, and a man standing on the tree’s opposite side. The 
man, wishing to see the squirrel, moves toward the other side of the tree, but just as 
quickly as he moves, so does the squirrel. Thus the trunk of the tree is always between 
the two, and the man never catches sight of the squirrel. From this scene, James extracts 
the metaphysical question: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? Certainly he 
circles the tree, and the squirrel is on the tree, yet it is not so clear-cut whether or not he 
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circles the squirrel.21 How to answer this question? “Mindful of the scholastic adage that 
whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction,”22 James says it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of “going round” before we can settle on an answer. If 
“going round” means passing from the north of the squirrel to the east, then to the south, 
then to the west, and finally to the north, then certainly the man goes round him. But if 
“going round” means moving from in front of him, to the right of him, then behind him, 
then to his left, and returning to in front of him, then just as clearly the man does not go 
round the squirrel. This example draws out the essence of James’s pragmatist method, 
which is to resolve disputed questions “that otherwise might be interminable” by looking 
to what their terms mean in practice.23  
  
James uses the squirrel example to show that the pragmatist method quite simply and 
sensibly seeks to resolve questions by clarifying their terms. It does this by analyzing the 
terms’ practical import in order to ferret out the merely verbal or semantic disputes. The 
heart of the pragmatist method is “to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective 
practical consequences.” Moreover, “[i]f no practical difference whatever can be traced, 
then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle.”24 Much of 
the work of the pragmatist method lies in exposing the so-called distinctions without 
differences, that is, those merely verbal or semantic debates, and lightening the 
philosophical load by setting them aside. As James writes, 
 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into 
insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a 
concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t 
make a difference elsewhere—no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t 
express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent 
upon the fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and 
somewhen.25 
 
Thus James intends to discount those logical and metaphysical debates that lack any 
experiential implications or consequences and so neither guide men’s actions nor help 
them understand their experience.26 But importantly the method does not simply dismiss 
all metaphysical issues. Indeed, James’s conviction is that certain metaphysical ideas and 
realities are of the utmost importance in our lives, and so the questions about these things 
are crucial. He writes,  
 
The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what difference 
it will make to you and me, at definite instants in our life, if this world-
formula or that world-formula be the true one.27 
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The pragmatist method will thus resolve philosophical questions in one of two ways: 
either by attempting to identify a specific answer grounded in practical experience, or by 
calling off the debate. In either case, the practical import of the question and its answer—
the concrete impact on life and experience, or lack thereof—is determinative. 
 
James maintains that this is no new method. He includes Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume among its practitioners.28 He also notes the similarities between the 
pragmatist method and the classical empirical approach to knowledge. Both pragmatism 
and empiricism eschew rationalist models that fail to draw from and relate directly to 
human experience; both turn “away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, and pretended absolutes and origins…towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power.”29 
Pragmatism balks at the impotence and primitive nature of metaphysical schematizing, 
which seeks to quell the enigma of the universe by simply naming its principle, and 
which rests once a name has been assigned. Indeed, pragmatism pushes onward, not 
satisfied with mere names. The pragmatist method will take a name and seek to draw out 
“its practical cash-value” and then “set it at work within the stream of your experience.”   
 
As James articulates it, the pragmatist method is open to any and all conclusions that 
human experience can affirm. It is not tendentious, biased, or preferential in any manner. 
It favors no particular theories or results but is rather simply “an attitude of 
orientation…away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; 
and…towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”30 Notwithstanding this apparent 
affinity with empiricism, in practice the pragmatist may well be more consistently 
empirical than the ordinary empiricist. Whereas practitioners of empirical science often 
tend to be biased toward a materialist worldview and to favor only those results and 
conclusions that are coherent within that worldview, the Jamesian pragmatist is not so 
biased. Indeed, pragmatism “has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so 
long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you 
somewhere.”31 Pragmatism has “no a priori prejudices against theology,”32 whereas 
empirical science quite often does. In sum, the theoretic hospitality of the pragmatist far 
exceeds that of the typical empiricist. 
 
In Lectures III, IV, and VIII of Pragmatism, James applies his pragmatist method to a 
host of philosophical issues, including the understanding of God, the notion of substance, 
the question of design in nature, the free will versus determinism debate, and the problem 
of the one and the many. Here we see clearly the broad reach of James’s pragmatist 
method: “so far from keeping her eyes on the immediate practical foreground, as she is 
accused of doing, [pragmatism] dwells just as much upon the world’s remotest 
perspectives.”33 Pragmatism does not neglect or reject intellectual abstractions, but in its 
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investigation of these it “shifts the emphasis and looks forward into facts themselves.”34 
The pragmatist method takes abstract concepts seriously; moreover, it insists that in order 
to do this, it is necessary to measure such concepts against practical, empirical 
experience. If they are real, things like substance and free will cannot be taken “in 
themselves, as something august and exalted above facts.”35 Rather, if they are real, they 
must make some real difference in the world. Whatever conclusions we draw, in the 
operation of speculative intellect, the experiential import of the positions we hold are 
necessarily determinative.36 Indeed, we will never affirm or deny a position, except 
through some reference to the concrete realm in which the notion may “break into life.” It 
is this real difference that makes it possible for us to know of them, and it is precisely this 
real difference that pragmatism tracks.  
 
 
IV 
 
A Theory of Truth. The pragmatist theory of truth emerges, in Lecture VI of Pragmatism, 
as yet another application of his pragmatist method. Confronted with the philosophical 
problem of understanding what truth is, the pragmatist begins by asking, “What 
difference does such a thing as ‘truth’ make in anyone’s life?” What is its “cash-value”?37 
Built into the very asking of this sort of question is the presumption that truth is 
something known only, and wholly, through our experience. “Truth” is our term, and so 
there cannot be anything about it that is inaccessible to us. The notion is capable of full 
articulation, and the reliable mechanism by which to analyze it is our simple, 
straightforward appeal to experience. The appropriate analysis of truth is necessarily a 
functional one; it pins downs the answers to questions like: Why do people seek truth? 
What conditions are important in establishing truth? What consequences arise in 
association with truth? Apart from these sorts of questions, any account of truth will be 
not merely abstract, but artificial and indeed irrelevant.38 As we have seen, for James, any 
philosophical problem or concept is meaningful only insofar as it conducts some business 
in the concrete, empirical realm. Thus, a good theory of truth must explain truth on this 
level. A good theory will reveal what truth is simply by uncovering what truth is “known 
as” by us. Indeed, to go beyond this level in an account of truth is to overreach—to 
speculate idly and to exceed our human capacity for knowing. 
 
So, what difference does “truth” make in anyone’s life? What is truth known as? To 
begin, it is important to note that truth is something said of our ideas or beliefs 
concerning what is; these are, as it were, the substrate of truth, and “truth” expresses 
some relation between our thought and the world. In this regard James is in line with a 
traditional correspondence theory of truth, and yet he explicitly takes issue with such a 
theory. Though a correspondence theory is not necessarily incorrect, according to James, 
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is too abstract for him to accept. He is amenable to a correspondence definition of truth, 
namely, that “truth” in some way indicates the agreement between thought and reality, 
but he finds such a formulation rather simplistic and imprecise. Too often the talk about 
“agreement” is “offhand and irreflective.” For example, he notes the agreement-relation 
is sometimes described as the idea’s “copying” reality. Copying, he says, is inadequate to 
explain the relation between thought and thing, for in many cases we have true thoughts 
that are far from good copies of the things to which they refer. Most laymen, for example, 
will think of the inner mechanism of a clock in a primitive, nontechnical way that “is 
much less of a copy, yet…passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the reality.”39 To 
summarize, pragmatist truth does indeed entail some agreement between thought and 
reality, but what distinguishes it for James is the effort to say more than just that. 
 
Specifically, pragmatism pushes further and asks what it actually means for thought and 
reality to “agree.” When we speak of truth, we are necessarily referring to something that 
is not a disembodied abstraction but that is, rather, personally manifest, a feature of 
certain ideas held in someone’s consciousness. Truth is a property of certain of our 
beliefs and ideas, and so it is to these that we look in order to flesh out our understanding 
of truth. Importantly, functionality is what divides true and false ideas, according to 
James: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. 
False ideas are those that we cannot.”40 This statement is the kernel of James’s account of 
truth. The activities of assimilation, validation, corroboration, and verification are central 
to the pragmatist notion of truth. But James moves to still more novel and controversial 
ground in asserting that these activities are the very essence of truth. 
 
[Truth] happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its 
verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying 
itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of valid-ation.41 
 
Here James stakes his claim. Against the traditional intellectualist assumption that truth is 
a fixed and eternal entity that exists prior to and independently of any knower,42 James 
maintains that truth is not fixed and eternal but made, that truth comes into being in the 
very processes of verification and validation. Indeed, for James, there is no truth outside 
of these processes. Pragmatist truth exists dynamically and, in some sense, contingently 
in the life of the knower inasmuch as its very being is caused by the knower when she 
forms and verifies certain ideas.43 
 
If truth is an event or process in the life of the knower, what does it look like? How does 
verification proceed? How is truth made? Pragmatically, verification is bound up with 
satisfaction. Verification consists in certain practical consequences of my idea, 
specifically, the activity of using an idea or belief to navigate successfully through my 
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experience. In the process of its verification, my idea leads me—through my stock of 
other ideas and through my experience itself—to make certain agreeable connections and 
transitions in my life. This “progressive, harmonious, satisfactory” movement through 
experience is precisely the practical import of my true idea, and this practical import is 
precisely its pragmatist truth.  
 
For example, when I think, “This aspirin relieves a headache,” and I proceed, on the basis 
of that idea, to take the aspirin and to have my headache relieved, my original idea is 
verified as I am satisfied—it is made true, known to be true, precisely as I am relieved 
and not a moment sooner.44 My true ideas serve as important tools for action and life; I 
do not think them for their own sakes. They are not ends in themselves, but “preliminary 
means towards other vital satisfactions.”45 They are means that have no significance apart 
from their functions and uses. Thus, there is an intimate relation between what is true and 
what is useful, as James writes: “True is the name for whatever starts the verification-
process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience.”46 My experience of 
truth is of truth as verified; that is, as an experience of the beneficial effects of true ideas, 
of their guiding me within my environment in ways satisfying to me.47 Apart from these 
concrete, experienced satisfactions or “workings” of my ideas, I know nothing to be true.  
  
In order more fully to draw out the novelty and distinctiveness of the pragmatist theory of 
truth, it is helpful to consider how James responds to two objections, namely, (1) that 
truth is not something made, and (2) that truth is not what satisfies us.  
 
 
V 
 
First Objection: Truth Is Not Something Made. James maintains that pragmatist truth is 
something made. It comes to be in and through the experience of the knower, as the 
verification of thoughts and ideas that lead us in fruitful ways through our experience. 
This understanding of truth as something made prompts the objection that “pragmatists 
put the cart before the horse.”48 James summarizes the so-called rationalist objection as 
follows: 
 
“Truth is not made,” [the critic] will say; “it absolutely obtains, being a 
unique relation that does not wait upon any process, but shoots straight 
over the head of experience, and hits its reality every time. Our belief that 
yon thing on the wall is a clock is true already, altho no one in the whole 
history of the world should verify it. The bare quality of standing in that 
transcendent relation is what makes any thought true that possesses it, 
whether or not there be verification…”49 
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According to the critic, pragmatism fails by not recognizing that truth is antecedent to its 
verification. The critic says truth is “transcendent,” wholly independent of and unaffected 
by our knowing (or not knowing) it. Truth exists prior to verification, and verification is 
not identified with truth but follows from it. We do not make truth but discover it. True 
ideas are and have been true even before the processes of verifying them are completed.50 
 
James’s reply to the objection that truth is not something made but something that exists 
independently of the human knower begins with a simple restatement and clarification of 
terms. First, he lays out the basic structure of truth: it is a relation between two things, 
namely, (a) my idea and (b) reality. Next, he affirms that both ideas and reality are 
grounded in “the matrix of experiential circumstance.” Neither exists outside this world, 
which provides both the context and the matter for all sorts of truth-relations to be borne 
out.51 Properly speaking, “truth” is the truth-relation, but James also uses the term to 
describe certain of our ideas. An idea is said to be true because it is recognized as one 
side of a truth-relation, and truth-relations are accessible to us only within our concrete 
experience. Much of the confusion concerning the question of the priority of “truth” 
arises simply because of looseness in the way the term is used.52 Some use it to describe 
(b), the “objective reality” side of the truth-relation, but James prefers to use it to refer to 
(a), the “subjective idea” side. He justifies this preference by the following argument: any 
object is open to being the referent of false ideas, so why use the term “truth” to indicate 
the object?It will be better to use “truth” to indicate a property of some ideas about the 
object rather than the object itself.53 
 
To return to the objection, then: With regard to the truth-relation, James does not disagree 
that something is independent of human knowing; however, he will not call this 
independent something truth per se, for truth is the relation between my idea and 
reality—and thus much depends on me, the knower of truth. Indeed, “the ‘experience’ 
which the pragmatic definition postulates is the independent something which the anti-
pragmatist accuses him of ignoring.”54 So, for James, the background or source of truth, 
if you will—namely, our concrete experience, “this fundamentum of circumstance 
surrounding the object and idea”55—is independent, while the truth-relation, which is 
what the term “truth” signifies, is not.   
 
So how is it that truth—the truth-relation—is dependent and indeed made? Quite simply, 
the truth-relation requires a knower engaged in processes of verification that take place in 
concrete experience. Truth comes into being—that is to say, the truth-relation exists—
precisely when a knower’s idea is experienced as comporting with reality, thereby 
informing him and providing him some benefit. Indeed, the truth-relation is known as an 
experience of beneficial effects: our ideas work, they prove out, they facilitate our 
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adaptation to the environment. As James puts it, “you cannot define what you mean by 
calling [ideas] true without referring to their functional possibilities”; otherwise, the 
relation between idea and reality is “mere coexistence or bare withness,” or some other 
sort of generically imprecise relation that does not properly capture the special nature of 
truth.56 Truth as truth-relation entails experiencing our ideas and our relation with and 
through them to the realities of the concrete world.   
 
Further, James’s offers a nuanced argument that not only rebuts the criticism but also 
lends support to his position by showing that the rationalist position is actually grounded 
in pragmatist principles. First, he notes that, owing to the regularities, similarities, and 
general predictability present in the world, we often use one verification process as a 
proxy for many others. Through our collective human experience we form concepts, 
rules, laws, and other sorts of generalizations—all having their origins in the direct 
verification processes of some individual’s experience—and, without necessarily directly 
verifying them ourselves, we use these as guides in our own lives. To the extent that there 
are no unexpected results when we use them, these thoughts are indirectly verified for us. 
Moreover, the pragmatist will say that, strictly speaking, in these instances the truth-
relation is experienced while the verification is suppressed or implicit; truth in such cases 
consists not in the actual verification of these thoughts but rather in their verifiability or 
possible verification.   
 
Now, according to James, the rationalist position regarding the priority of truth derives 
from the fact that so many of our truths are of this indirectly verified or verifiable type. 
He writes, “The quality of truth, obtaining ante rem, pragmatically means, then, the fact 
that in such a world innumerable ideas work better by their indirect or possible than by 
their direct and actual verification. Truth ante rem means only verifiability, then.”57 This 
practice of working with indirect and possible verifications makes our lives much easier 
and more productive, since it relieves us of the time-consuming and intolerable, indeed 
impossible, burden of directly verifying all of our truths for ourselves. Yet because so 
often we do not engage in the actual verification processes that constitute the bulk of our 
truths—notwithstanding that these processes are the essence of the truths, the ultimate 
explanation of why they are truths—we may lose sight, as the rationalists do, of the fact 
that processes of verification are literally how our truths come into being.   
 
James turns the tables on his rationalist critics. They insist that truth does not require a 
knower, that it is transcendent or independent of human knowing, that it exists before and 
after—indeed regardless of whether—it is actually grasped by someone. But to view truth 
in this manner is to err, according to James, with respect to the question of priority. He 
contends that the sort of “discarnate truth” which his critics so revere is in fact “static, 
impotent, and relatively spectral.” He writes: 
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Essential truth, the truth of the intellectualists, the truth with no one 
thinking it, is like the coat that fits tho no one has ever tried it on, like the 
music that no ear has listened to. It is less real, not more real, than the 
verified article; and to attribute a superior degree of glory to it seems little 
more than a piece of perverse abstraction-worship…Intellectualist truth is 
then only pragmatist truth in posse.58 
 
At the very least, this sense of truth is likened to a hypothesis or preliminary thought that 
has yet to be tested and verified in concrete experience. Thus it may be apt to say that, 
while not necessarily temporally prior to intellectualist truth, pragmatist truth is 
metaphysically prior in the way that act is metaphysically prior to potency.   
 
 
VI 
 
Second Objection: Truth Is Not What Satisfies. According to the pragmatist, I know my 
idea to be verified, and hence true, when I am aware that it satisfies me in some manner. 
Critics see this as no more than a subjectivist or relativist notion of truth. In this view, 
pragmatist truth, grounded in the satisfaction and verification of the individual knower, is 
no truth at all in any meaningful sense, for it is grounded in the individual and thus lacks 
objectivity, or is at least uncomfortably compatible with subjectivity.59 The following 
explication of the Jamesian response to this sort of criticism will draw out three important 
yet often-overlooked elements of James’s pragmatism. First, pragmatism is a theory of 
truth that presupposes objectivity in the traditional sense and is grounded in and 
measured by empirical experience. Accordingly, true ideas for the pragmatist are never 
the products of pure subjective preference, for such preference alone cannot guarantee 
that an individual is in good, working contact with reality. Second, the formulation of 
pragmatist truths is necessarily constrained not only by empirical experience but also by 
conceptual ideas and logical relations, as well as by a whole body of previously accepted 
truths. Finally, James’s development of the notion of absolute truth helps moves the 
individual knower beyond epistemic solitude and underscores the need for progressively 
better, more objective, truths to be generated within and through the community. These 
elements of James’s pragmatism, I argue, serve to rebut the charge of subjectivism that is 
sometimes leveled against it and to flesh out some overlooked aspects of the pragmatist 
account. 
 
To return to the criticism: Is truth really something that depends on me and my 
assessments and satisfactions? No doubt I would find it satisfying to believe that I have 
$100 million in the bank, but such satisfaction would have nothing to do with the truth of 
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the matter. Similarly, I may find it quite dissatisfying to believe that I am mortal, but here 
again, satisfaction and dissatisfaction are quite irrelevant to truth. It would be easy to 
think of countless examples of satisfying falsities and dissatisfying truths. To define truth 
in terms of personal satisfaction, as James does, thus seems problematic.60 But is it really 
a problem?  
 
James answers his critics by saying that they fail to grasp an important point, namely, that 
there is no satisfaction apart from verification—verification which binds us to an 
objective order. For the pragmatist, it is not the case that the satisfaction associated with 
an idea causes that idea to be true. Satisfaction does not come first. Rather, satisfaction is 
eventually a necessary consequence of the fact that the idea is verifiable—it coheres with 
an objective order and is not an ultimately frustrating delusion. For the pragmatist, truth 
is not a product of willfulness, wishful thinking, or caprice. On the contrary, the 
pragmatist, knowing truth through verification, is constitutionally guarded against such 
subjectivism. James writes: 
 
Truth,…meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly 
incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs 
play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience: 
they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.61 
 
Grounded as it is in experience, pragmatist truth cannot flout the authority of the 
objective realm.62 Ultimately, only those ideas and beliefs that comport with that order 
will be verified, and, in turn, only those will prove satisfying to believe.63 In other words, 
ultimately, there is no satisfaction without verification. This simple but key point is often 
overlooked or distorted, which moves James to clarify the position in The Meaning of 
Truth:  
 
The pragmatist calls satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but I 
have everywhere called them insufficient unless reality be also 
incidentally led to.  If…reality…were cancelled from the pragmatist’s 
universe of discourse, he would straightaway give the name of falsehoods 
to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness…[T]here can 
be no truth if there is nothing to be true about.64  
 
To believe what could never be verified is to be in contact with falsity, which is 
ultimately associated with “eccentricity and isolation…foiled and barren thinking…clash 
and contradiction.”65 Though some truths might be unpleasant to face or own up to, such 
discomforts pale in comparison with the dissatisfactions associated with our falsities. For 
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James, we do not have unconditional discretion to construct, decide upon, or choose our 
truths. Quite the contrary, the way the world is ultimately limits pragmatist truth.  
 
Further, against critics who have a problem with hinging a theory of truth on satisfaction, 
it is relevant to point to James’s rather broad understanding of the notion of satisfaction. 
It would be a mistake to read him as defining satisfaction exclusively in terms of personal 
feelings and self-serving appetites. Rather, the satisfaction associated with truths is better 
articulated as “the maximum possible sum of satisfactions.”66 In addition to natural 
desires for what is immediately and personally gratifying, we also have desires that 
extend beyond our personal interests. The things that satisfy us are best understood as a 
family of factors pertaining to interests that are not only subjective or personal but also 
more objective—factors such as evidence, consistency, clarity, and theoretical elegance.67 
The satisfactoriness of our truths need not be construed as a wholly subjective affair, and 
so the criticism is deflated. 
 
In addition to his articulation of a theory of objective truth grounded in empirical 
experience, James’s “genetic” account of truth also argues against the charge of 
subjectivity. According to this account, when we formulate truths, we are constrained not 
only by the evidence of empirical experience but also by other abstract, purely conceptual 
and logical ideas and their relations.  James writes: 
 
Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, 
our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities, be 
such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, 
under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration.68 
 
He includes “the whole body of other truths already in our possession”69 among those 
things that limit the formulation of new truths. Any newly formed true idea or belief must 
“derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some 
sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly.”70 An individual’s pure 
subjectivity has little room for maneuver in the formulation of truths. To use the language 
of correspondence, pragmatist truths must “agree” with all three sorts of realities: 
empirical facts, conceptual and logical relations, and previously accepted truths.71 In this 
way the pragmatist truth-relation exhibits the virtue of a sort of tensile strength. This 
agreement is a far more dynamic relation than that rather imprecisely suggested by a 
traditional correspondence theory.72  
 
Finally, James’s development of the notion of absolute truth also argues against the claim 
that pragmatist truth is subjectivist or relativist. In contrast to all presently held truths, 
“the absolutely true” means, for James, “what no farther experience will ever alter…that 
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ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all of our temporary truths will 
some day converge.”73 James does not assert that this absolute truth is the necessary, 
inevitable culmination of human truths, to be achieved at some point in the future; rather, 
it is simply something we might achieve. Here and now it is a “regulative notion” that 
emerges through the course of human experience when we recognize as false certain 
ideas and beliefs that we once believed to be true. Retrospectively recognizing the falsity 
of some of our ideas and, in turn, seeing our general fallibility, we tacitly acknowledge a 
higher standard against which we measure ourselves.   
 
Our presently held truths are ever subject to revision, and the process will proceed in 
accordance with the pragmatist criteria of verification and satisfaction. It may begin, at 
least in theory, with the truths formed and held by a single knower. Such ideas and beliefs 
will have been established insofar as they are both verified for that individual and 
consequently somehow satisfactory for him to hold. Now, in a world of many individual 
knowers, no single individual’s personal experience will ever be perfectly private or 
solitary. For this reason, the criteria of verification and satisfaction will necessarily play 
out within a context of interconnectedness, and they will necessarily involve 
considerations pertaining to the broader communal setting. What is verifiable and 
satisfactory for me necessarily takes some account of the needs, interests, and demands of 
other individuals and the whole community. True ideas and beliefs thus become 
“progressively more objective” as they prove verifiable and satisfactory in the experience 
of more and more individuals.74 Moreover, any individual’s truths are unlikely to hold up 
well against the measure of future experience unless they are fortified by the experience 
of other individuals. This communal vetting of truths produces better truths, that is, ones 
less likely to be confounded by future experience; and the projected culmination of the 
process is absolute truth. In this doctrine James’s commitment to the objectivity of truth 
once again is visible, notwithstanding his insistence that truth can emerge only within the 
experience of a subject, the individual knower. 
 
 
VII 
 
This sketch of three uses of the term “pragmatism” has shown that the Jamesian 
pragmatist exhibits a sort of commonsense temperament that blends, in nonideological 
fashion, the tough-minded bent of empirical science and a tender-minded openness to 
spiritual realities and religious belief. In this perspective, pragmatism as a method for 
settling philosophical disputes disinterestedly seeks out the practical differences and 
consequences implicit in the meanings of the terms of any debate. Applied to the question 
of the nature of truth, this method arrives at a view of truth that is rooted in the concrete, 
experiential world of verification and satisfaction. What I know to be true is what is 
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verifiable, and hence what proves beneficial and indeed satisfying to accept as true. The 
pragmatist doctrine of truth emphasizes the mind’s active role in the formation of truths; 
but, importantly, it is not freewheeling. It respects the constraints of reality, and the 
formation of new truths is always conditioned by previously held or prior truths that have 
been derived from the objective order of reality. James gives us a novel perspective and 
way of talking about the issues at hand, but he articulates a traditional epistemological 
attitude and structure of truth. Pragmatism’s subtitle, “A New Name for Some Old Ways 
of Thinking,” is well justified. 
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